

**SECRET**

BRIEFING BY BRIG GEN JOSEPH A. McCHRISTIAN, ACofS, J2, HQ MACV,  
28 NOVEMBER 1965 - SAIGON.

MR. AMBASSADOR, SECRETARY McNAMARA, GENERAL WHEELER-I WILL PRESENT OUR ESTIMATE OF THE VC/PAVN BUILDUP AND THEN, BASED UPON CAPABILITIES, FORECAST ENEMY STRENGTH AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1966.

I WILL ALSO LIST PROBABLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION AND VULNERABILITIES.

THE OVERALL STRATEGIC PLAN OF THE DRV LAO DONG PARTY IS THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONQUEST OF THE RVN. THE FIRST PART OF THE PLAN, IN ESSENCE, CALLED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FIRM POLITICAL AND MILITARY BASE. HAVING ESTABLISHED A SECURE BASE OF OPERATIONS AND FORCED THE RVN FORCES INTO A DEFENSIVE POSTURE, THE COMMUNISTS WOULD THEN BE IN A POSITION TO MOVE INTO THE FINAL PHASE, THE ANNIHILATION OF THE ENEMY. BY MID 1964 THE VC WERE WELL ON THEIR WAY TO ACCOMPLISHING THESE GOALS. INFILTRATION ROUTES FROM THE DRV TO THE RVN VIA LAOS AND CAMBODIA HAD BEEN IMPROVED, SEA INFILTRATION WAS ALSO IN FULL SWING AND THEIR LOGISTICAL SYSTEM AND BASE AREAS WERE WELL ESTABLISHED.

\*Army, JCS and DIA  
review(s) completed.

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J2/MB371/65

DIA # 9947

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A MAJOR CONSIDERATION IN THE COMMUNISTS PLAN IS THE ATTAINMENT OF "STRATEGIC MOBILITY". STRATEGIC MOBILITY IS THEIR ANSWER TO OUR TACTICAL MOBILITY. THEIR OBJECTIVE IS TO AMASS SUFFICIENT NUMBERS OF MANEUVER BATTALIONS TO BE CAPABLE OF POSING A SUFFICIENT THREAT IN WIDELY SEPARATED AREAS WHICH WILL NOT ONLY TIE DOWN LARGE NUMBERS OF ALLIED FORCES IN STATIC DEFENSIVE ROLES, BUT WILL ALSO ALLOW THEM TO DESTROY SELECTED TARGETS AT A TIME AND PLACE OF THEIR CHOOSING. IN ORDER TO ATTAIN THE FORCE STRUCTURE NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN "STRATEGIC MOBILITY" HANOI APPARENTLY DECIDED TO INTRODUCE REGULAR PAVN TROOPS INTO THE RVN. INDICATIONS THEREOF CAN BE TRACED TO AS EARLY AS APRIL 1964 WHEN THE 325TH PAVN INFANTRY DIVISION BEGAN AN ACCELERATED TRAINING PROGRAM IN THE VICINITY OF DONG HOI IN THE DRV.

THE INFILTRATION OF PAVN REGIMENTS IN ORDER OF THEIR ARRIVAL IN SOUTH VIETNAM IS SHOWN ON THIS VIEWGRAPH.  
(VUGRAPH NO. 1 ON)

THE THREE REGIMENTS OF THE 325TH PAVN DIVISION ARRIVED AS FOLLOWS:

THE 95TH REGIMENT IN DECEMBER 1964, THE 101ST IN FEBRUARY 1965 AND THE 18TH IN APRIL 1965. A NON-DIVISIONAL PAVN REGIMENT, THE 32ND, WHICH TRAINED AT SON TAY AND

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XUAN MAI, DRV, INFILTRATED INTO THE RVN SHORTLY AFTER THE 95TH, AN U/I REGIMENT INFILTRATED INTO QUANG TRI IN JULY. WE HAVE NOT CONFIRMED THE EXACT TIME OF ARRIVAL OF THE 42ND REGIMENT. THE 250TH REGIMENT TRAINED AT PHU BINH DISTRICT, THAI NGUYEN PROVINCE IN THE DRV AND WAS FORMED FROM INDIVIDUALS DRAFTED FROM HANOI AND THAI NGUYEN PROVINCE. DEPARTING NORTH VIETNAM IN LATE JUNE, THE 250TH ARRIVED IN SOUTH VIETNAM IN QUANG DUC PROVINCE IN MID SEPTEMBER.

WE ALSO KNOW THAT THE 325TH DIVISION LEFT CADRES FOR THE RECONSTITUTION OF A SECOND 325TH DIVISION PRIOR TO ITS DEPARTURE FROM THE DRV IN LATE 1964 EARLY 1965. PRISONERS CAPTURED EARLY IN THE PLEI ME BATTLE IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES AS MEMBERS OF THE NEW 325TH DIVISION. IN ADDITION, SEVERAL CAPTURED DOCUMENTS INDICATED THAT THE NEW 325TH DIVISION HAD, IN FACT, FORMED THREE MORE REGIMENTS. ONE OF THESE REGIMENT S, WHICH HAS BEEN CONFIRMED AS THE "SONG LAM" REGIMENT, DEPARTED THE DRV IN JULY AND ARRIVED IN THE RVN IN EARLY OCTOBER. THIS UNIT WAS GIVEN SEVEN DAYS TRAINING AND RESUPPLIED PRIOR TO ATTACKING PLEI ME CAMP. A VIET CONG CAPTIVE FROM THE "SONG LAM" REGIMENT STATED

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THAT THE OTHER TWO REGIMENTS OF THE NEWLY REFORMED 325TH DIVISION WERE ALSO TO INFILTRATE INTO THE RVN. HOWEVER, THE TIME FRAME WAS NOT SPECIFIED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE OTHER TWO REGIMENTS OF THE RECENTLY RECONSTITUTED 325TH DIVISION ARE EITHER INFILTRATING OR ARE IN THE LATE STAGES OF INFILTRATION PREPARATIONS.

ONE OF THE PAVN UNITS WITH WHICH THE 1ST AIR CAV DIV WAS IN CONTACT AT PLEI ME WAS THE 66TH REGIMENT OF THE 304TH PAVN INFANTRY DIVISION WHICH ARRIVED IN COUNTRY IN OCTOBER 1965. AS REPORTED BY MACV IN MARCH 1965, ELEMENTS OF THE 304TH DIVISION HAD BEEN PREPARING TO INFILTRATE INTO SOUTH VIETNAM OVER THE LAST YEAR. ELEMENTS OF THE 304TH DIVISION WERE ALSO REPORTED AS PARTICIPATING IN THE ATTACK ON THE ROYAL LAO ARMY (FAR) OFFICER'S SCHOOL AT DONG HENE LAOS, IN MARCH OF THIS YEAR. PRISONERS TAKEN AFTER THIS ATTACK REVEALED THAT THEY WERE MEMBERS OF THE 9TH REGIMENT OF THE 304TH DIVISION WHO WERE ON THEIR WAY TO INFILTRATE INTO THE RVN, AND HAD BEEN DIVERTED IN ORDER TO ASSIST THE PATHET LAO IN THEIR ATTACK ON DONG HENE. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE 9TH IS UNKNOWN.

IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE

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66TH MAY HAVE BROUGHT THEIR 120MM MORTARS WITH THEM. IF TRUE, THEY WILL BE THE FIRST 120MM MORTARS INTRODUCED INTO RVN.

A SIGNIFICANT FEATURE OF THE INTRODUCTION OF REGULAR PAVN UNITS INTO THE RVN IS THE INCREASING RATE OF INFILTRATION. IN CONTRAST TO THE EARLY RATE OF 3 BATTALION EQUIVALENTS PER MONTH DURING THE LATTER HALF OF 1964 THERE IS GROWING EVIDENCE THAT THE DRV HAS SENT AS MANY AS 12 BATTALIONS PER MONTH, FOR EXAMPLE, THE INFILTRATION OF THE U/I QUANG TRI, 250TH, THE "SONG LAM" AND 66TH PAVN REGIMENTS WHICH ALL LEFT THE DRV IN LATE JUNE AND EARLY JULY OF THIS YEAR. (VUGRAPH NO. 1 OFF). THIS ACCELERATED INFILTRATION RATE WAS PROBABLY DUE TO SEVERAL FACTORS, THE PRIMARY ONE BEING THE DRV REVISION OF THEIR ESTIMATE OF THE FORCES NEEDED TO MAINTAIN "STRATEGIC MOBILITY" IN VIEW OF THE EXPECTED BUILDUP OF U. S. AND OTHER FREE WORLD FORCES. THE APPARENT NEED OF HANOI AND THE VIET CONG FOR A MILITARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY TO ILLUSTRATE THAT THE COMMUNISTS STILL RETAINED THE INITIATIVE AND TO BOOST HOMEFRONT MORALE COULD HAVE BEEN AMONG THE SEVERAL FACTORS.

DURING THE TIME THAT PAVN REGIMENTS WERE INFILTRATING,

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THE INFILTRATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE CADRE PERSONNEL DESTINED FOR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY UNITS AND ORGANIZATIONS ALSO CONTINUED. AT THE SAME TIME NEW VC UNITS WERE BEING FORMED IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

A COMPARISON OF VC/PAVN ORDER OF BATTLE INTELLIGENCE IS SHOWN HERE. (VUGRAPH NO. 2 ON)

IN JULY 1964 OUR ORDER OF BATTLE INTELLIGENCE CARRIED A TOTAL OF 46 VC BATTALIONS; IN NOVEMBER 1965 WE HELD 83 VC BATTALIONS PLUS THE 27 INFILTRATED PAVN BATTALIONS FOR A TOTAL OF 110 (103 CONFIRMED, 4 PROBABLE AND 3 POSSIBLE BATTALIONS). (VUGRAPH NO. 2 OFF)

NOW LET US EXAMINE ENEMY MANPOWER AND LOGISTICAL RESOURCES. (VUGRAPH NO. 3 ON) TRAINED MILITARY FORCES LOCATED IN THE DRV INCLUDE: 265,000 REGULAR ARMY, 27,000 ARMED SECURITY FORCE, 200,000 CLASS I MILITIA AND A POTENTIAL OF 1.8 MILLION MILITIA. COMPOSITION OF THE REGULAR ARMY IS SHOWN BELOW. (PAUSE). WITHIN THIS FORCE STRUCTURE (FLIP ON). THERE ARE A TOTAL OF 38 INFANTRY REGIMENTS. THE CLASS I MILITIA PROVIDES A TRAINED POOL OF PERSONNEL FOR THE REGULAR ARMY AND PAVN IS CAPABLE OF MOBILIZING 475,000 MEN BY M-DAY PLUS 180. (VUGRAPH NO. 3 OFF)

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OF THE 38 PAVN INFANTRY REGIMENTS IN THE DRV DIA CONSIDERS 14 TO CONSTITUTE THE STRATEGIC RESERVES. THIS LEAVES 24 REGIMENTS WHICH COULD BE USED TO CADRE AND TRAIN NEW UNITS (VUGRAPH NO. 4 ON) IF THE PAVN UTILIZE 11 OF THESE AS TRAINING REGIMENTS AND EACH TRAINS A NEW LIGHT INFANTRY REGIMENT EVERY 90 DAYS THEN THE DRV CAN TRAIN 36 NEW REGIMENTS BY THE END OF 1966, PROVIDING 9 OF THEIR CURRENT REGULAR REGIMENTS ARE READY TO INFILTRATE, OR HAVE ALREADY TRAINED NEW REGIMENTS, THE DRV CAN MAINTAIN AN INFILTRATION RATE OF 3 REGIMENTS PER MONTH AT LEAST THROUGH 1966.

(VUGRAPH NO. 4 OFF)

IN SOUTH VIETNAM THE VIET CONG CONTROL A MANPOWER POOL OF 526,000 PHYSICALLY FIT MALES BETWEEN THE AGES OF 16 - 45. THEY ALSO HAVE A WELL ESTABLISHED GUERRILLA BASE AND TRAINING SYSTEM. WE ESTIMATE THAT THEY CAN FORM TWO NEW BATTALIONS EACH MONTH AND CAN TRAIN AT LEAST 2,500 REPLACEMENTS MONTHLY. BASED UPON A VC BATTALION STRENGTH OF 500 THESE TRAINEES WOULD EQUATE TO 5 BATTALIONS.

( VUGRAPH NO. 5 ON ) THIS VUGRAPH SHOWS THE PAVN/VC CAPABILITY TO INCREASE THEIR STRENGTH IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THIS IS EXPRESSED IN BATTALION EQUIVALENTS BECAUSE SOME TRAINEES WILL BE FORMED INTO NEW UNITS WHILE OTHERS WILL BE REPLACEMENTS.

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THE PAVN CAN TRAIN AND INFILTRATE 9 BATTALION

EQUIVALENTS PER MONTH AND THE VC SEVEN FOR A TOTAL OF 16.

(VUGRAPH NO. 5 OFF)

LET US NOW DETERMINE HOW MANY OF THESE BATTALION EQUIVALENTS ARE REQUIRED TO REPLACE LOSSES. (VUGRAPH NO. 6 ON)

THE BARS ON THIS VUGRAPH REPRESENT THE PAVN/VC AVERAGE QUARTERLY LOSSES. THESE LOSSES INCLUDE KILLED, CAPTURED, DESERTERS AND RALLIERS.

THE PROJECTED LOSSES PER QUARTER IS A STRAIGHT LINE PROJECTION BASED UPON THE AVERAGE QUARTERLY INCREASE IN LOSSES. THIS AMOUNTS TO ABOUT 4.5 BATTALION EQUIVALENTS PER QUARTER. THE BATTALION EQUIVALENT LOSSES PER QUARTER ARE SHOWN ON THE TOP OF EACH BAR GRAPH. (FLIP ON) THIS FLIP SHOWS THE BATTALION EQUIVALENT INPUTS EACH QUARTER BASED UPON THE 9 PAVN AND 7 VC INPUTS PER MONTH PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED OR 48 PER QUARTER. SUBTRACTING LOSSES FROM INPUTS WE OBTAIN THE NET GAIN PER QUARTER. BY THE LAST QUARTER OF 1966 LOSSES EQUAL INPUT. BY THAT TIME A TOTAL GAIN OF 45 BATTALION EQUIVALENTS WILL HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. ADDING THESE 45 TO THE CURRENT 110 WE CAN PROJECT A FORCE STRENGTH EQUIVALENT TO 155 BATTALIONS BY THE END OF 1966.

(VUGRAPH NO. 6 OFF)

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WE KNOW THAT PAVN/VC HAVE EXTENSIVE STOCKPILES IN MANY BASE AND STORAGE AREAS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. (VUGRAPH NO. 7 ON) THIS VUGRAPH SHOWS MAJOR BASE AREAS AND THE GENERAL DRIFT OF INFILTRATION ROUTES. THE ENEMY HAS HAD SEVERAL YEARS IN WHICH TO STOCKPILE AND PREPARE THE BATTLEFIELD IN ACCORDANCE WITH ACCEPTED COMMUNIST THEORY. (VUGRAPH NO. 7 OFF) THE PAVN CAPACITY TO INCREASE THEIR CURRENT LOGISTICAL SUPPORT IN THE RVN IS CONSIDERABLE. WE HAVE JUST COMPLETED AN LOC STUDY OF THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE (VUGRAPH NO. 8 ON) WE CONCLUDE THAT WITH A MAJOR TRUCK EFFORT THE DRV HAS THE CAPABILITY OF MOVING 300 TONS PER DAY FROM THE DRV THROUGH LAOS INTO THE RVN DURING THE DRY WEATHER. THIS 300 TON CAPABILITY FALLS OFF TO 50 TONS PER DAY BY VARIOUS TRANSPORT MEANS DURING THE NORMAL FIVE MONTH RAINY SEASON. THE AVERAGE YEAR ROUND DAILY CAPACITY FIGURES OUT TO BE 195 TONS PER DAY.

DRV LOGISTICAL CAPABILITY THROUGH CAMBODIA IS ALSO VERY SUBSTANTIAL. WE ARE UNABLE TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT THAT IS BEING INFILTRATED OR SMUGGLED INTO THE RVN. HOWEVER, WE CONSIDER 25 TONS PER DAY TO BE THE MINIMUM AMOUNT. BEST INFORMATION ON SEA INFILTRATION IS ABOUT 14 TONS PER DAY. WE CONSIDER BOTH THE SEA AND CAMBODIA OFFER A GREATER CAPABILITY BUT WE USE THE LOWER FIGURES FOR THE WANT OF MORE ACCURATE

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INFORMATION. ALTOGETHER PAVN'S CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT THEIR FORCES IN THE RVN TOTALS 234 TONS PER DAY. (VUGRAPH NO. 8 OFF)

WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF ADDITIONAL PAVN TROOPS AND IMPROVED LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, THE LEVEL OF COMBAT WILL INCREASE AND THE ENEMY LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS WILL INCREASE. WE ESTIMATE THAT REQUIRED POUNDS PER MAN PER DAY WILL REACH A LEVEL OF 8.2 POUNDS IN THE NEAR FUTURE FOR PAVN TROOPS AND 3.6 POUNDS FOR VIET CONG TROOPS. OUR ESTIMATE IS BASED ON A REDUCED VERSION OF A DIA STUDY (VUGRAPH NO. 9 ON). THE DIA STUDY GIVES 13.2 POUNDS FOR A PAVN SOLDIER IN LIGHT COMBAT IN THE RVN. WE HAVE REDUCED THAT AMOUNT IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER. ONE POUND FOR CLASS I BASED ON THE KNOWN PAVN/VC PLANNING FIGURE OF 2 POUNDS OF CLASS I PER MAN. WE ELIMINATE CLASS III FOR INFILTRATION AS WE HAVE ACCOUNTED FOR IT IN OUR LOC CAPACITIES. WE REDUCED THE AMOUNT OF CLASS V FROM 5.5 POUNDS TO 3.2 POUNDS. OUR REASON FOR THIS IS THAT WE CONSIDER THE LIGHT COMBAT RATE TO BE HIGH. WE CONSIDER A RATE OF 1/5 OF THE FORCE TO BE ENGAGED IN COMBAT EVERY SEVENTH DAY AND EXPENDING 1/3 OF THEIR BASIC LOAD TO BE MORE ACCURATE. (VUGRAPH NO. 9 OFF). NOW LET US COMPUTE OUR TONNAGE REQUIREMENTS. (VUGRAPH NO. 10 ON)

AS WE HAVE SEEN, TOTAL LOC CAPACITY IS 234 TONS PER DAY. UNDER LIGHT COMBAT CONDITIONS PRESENT ENEMY FORCES WILL REQUIRE ABOUT 84 TONS PER DAY FROM OUTSIDE THE RVN OR FROM STOCK.

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WE COMPUTE THIS AS FOLLOWS: 27 PAVN BATTALIONS @ 1.86 TONS PER DAY EQUALS 50.22 TONS PER DAY. (CLASS I OF 2 POUNDS HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM PAVN AND VC TOTALS BECAUSE OF ITS AVAILABILITY WITHIN THE RVN) 83 VIET CONG BATTALIONS AT .4 TONS PER DAY EQUAL 33.20 TONS FOR A TOTAL OF 83.42 OR 84 TONS REQUIRED DAILY. WE HAVE AN EXCESS OF 150 TONS TO SUPPORT ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS. IF 150 IS DIVIDED BY 1.86 TONS WE FIND THAT 80 ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS CAN BE SUPPORTED. WE USED THE FIGURE FOR THE PAVN BATTALION BECAUSE IT REQUIRES MORE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT THAN THE VC BATTALION. THIS IS NOT INTENDED TO INDICATE THE 80 ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS WILL ALL BE PAVN. CONSEQUENTLY, WITH A MAXIMUM DRV EFFORT EXISTING LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS CAN SUPPORT THE CURRENT 110 PAVN/VC BATTALIONS PLUS 80 ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS FOR A TOTAL OF 190 BATTALIONS.

(VUGRAPH 10 OFF)

ENEMY STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE THEIR AIM OF A UNIFIED VIETNAM UNDER HANOI IS BASED UPON THE CONDUCT OF A LONG WAR DURING WHICH THEY WILL EXACT MAXIMUM ATTRITION ON ALLIED AND ESPECIALLY U. S. FORCES. THEY WILL AVOID COMBAT UNLESS THEY EXPECT VICTORY. THEY WILL ATTEMPT TO RETAIN A FORCE RATIO OF MANEUVER BATTALIONS IN THEIR FAVOR BY HOLDING ATTACKS AGAINST OUR BASES. DIVERSIONARY ATTACKS TO DISPERSE OUR FORCES AND SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS AT WIDESPREAD LOCATIONS. THEY WILL THREATEN AND ATTACK OUR BASE AREAS IN ORDER TO IMMOBILIZE THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF SECURITY FORCES AND TO

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DESTROY AIRCRAFT, EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES. THEY WILL MOUNT ATTACKS DESIGNED TO BRING ABOUT THE COMMITMENT OF OUR GENERAL RESERVES. THEY WILL ATTACK ISOLATED FORCES IN ORDER TO INFILCT HEAVY LOSSES. THEY WILL CONTINUE ACTIONS TO ISOLATE AND DOMINATE THE HIGHLANDS IN ORDER TO SECURE THEIR BASE AREA AT THE TERMINUS OF THEIR LAOS INFILTRATION ROUTES. THEY WILL EXERT CONTINUOUS PRESSURE TO INTERDICT ROADS AND RAILROADS, TO TERRORIZE AREAS OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL AND TO WEAR DOWN OUR WILL TO RESIST. THEY WILL DEFEND THEIR MAJOR BASES BECAUSE THEIR PROTRACTED CONFLICT DEPENDS UPON THE STOCKPILING THEY HAVE BEEN DOING FOR YEARS.

ALTHOUGH THE ENEMY HAS GREAT CAPABILITIES HE ALSO HAS SIGNIFICANT VULNERABILITIES. HE MUST DEFEND HIS LOGISTIC BASE AREAS, AND HIS LONG LOGISTICAL LOC IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO INTERDICTION. HE IS ESPECIALLY VULNERABLE TO AIR AND ARTILLERY ATTACK, SUSTAINED COMBAT OPERATIONS AND AGGRESSIVE PURSUIT. ADDITIONALLY, HE IS DEPENDENT UPON THE SUPPORT OF THE LOCAL POPULATION.

IN SUMMARY, WE CONCLUDE THAT THE ENEMY HAS THE CAPABILITY TO INCREASE HIS STRENGTH TO 155 BATTALIONS BY THE END OF 1966. FROM THAT DATE ON HIS LOSSES SHOULD EXCEED HIS INPUT.

THIS CONCLUDES MY PORTION OF THE BRIEFING. I WILL BE FOLLOWED BY THE J3, GENERAL DEPUY.

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PAVN REGIMENTS in SOUTH VIETNAM

(IN ORDER OF ARRIVAL)

95th REGIMENT DECEMBER 1964

32nd REGIMENT JANUARY 1965

101st REGIMENT FEBRUARY 1965

18th REGIMENT APRIL 1965

U/I QUANG TRI (PROBABLE) JULY 1965

42nd REGIMENT (POSSIBLE) ?

250th REGIMENT SEPTEMBER 1965

SONG LAM REGIMENT OCTOBER 1965

66th REGIMENT OCTOBER 1965

TOTAL: 9 REGIMENTS/27 INFANTRY BATTALIONS

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**COMPARISON**  
**OF**

**ORDER OF BATTLE INTELLIGENCE  
ON ENEMY BATTALIONS**

NUMBER OF VC BNS	<u>JULY 1964</u>	46	<u>NOV 1965</u>	83*
NUMBER OF PAVN BNS		0		27
TOTAL ENEMY BNS		46		110

\* INCLUDES 10 ARTY BNS.

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PAVN ORDER OF BATTLE

<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>REGTS</u>
REGULAR ARMY	265,000
ARMED SECURITY FORCE	27,100
CLASS I MILITIA	200,000
MILITIA (POTENTIAL)	1,800,000

<u>COMPOSITION</u>	
INFANTRY DIVISIONS	5
INFANTRY BRIGADES	8
INFANTRY REGIMENTS	12
ARTILLERY DIVISION	-
COASTAL DEFENSE DIVISION	-
AAA DIVISION	3
AAA REGIMENTS	30
SA 2 BATTALIONS	12-15

MOBILIZATION DAY + 180 = 475,000

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~~PAVN TRAINING CAPABILITY~~

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TRAINING REGTS</u>	<u>REGTS COMPLETED TRAINING</u>	<u>REGTS AVAIL. TO INFILTRATE</u>	<u>REGTS INFILTRATING</u>
DEC	65	0	9	3
JAN	66	0	6	3
FEB		0	3	3
MAR		3	4	3
APR		4	4	3
MAY		3	5	3
JUN		4	6	3
JUL		4	7	3
AUG		3	8	3
SEP		4	9	3
OCT		3	9	3
NOV				
DEC				

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
## BATTALION EQUIVALENTS

1. PAVN CAN TRAIN AND INFILTRATE 9 BN EQUIVALENTS PER MONTH.
2. VC CAN TRAIN 7 BATTALION EQUIVALENTS PER MONTH.
3. TOTAL BATTALION EQUIVALENTS AVAILABLE PER MONTH 16.

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
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**PAVN/VCI AVERAGE QUARTERLY LOSSES  
(INCLUDES KILLED, CAPTURED, DESERTERS & RALLIERS)**



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ESTIMATED LOC CAPABILITIES

TONS PER DAY  
MINIMUM    MAXIMUM    AVERAGE

LAOS    BY ROAD DURING THE DRY  
SEASON NOV — MAY

BY VARIOUS MEANS WET  
SEASON

300

50

YEARLY DAILY AVERAGE

195

CAMBODIA

25

SEA

14

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8  
234

# CONTENTS

**POUNDS PER MAN PER DAY REQUIREMENT FOR  
LIGHT COMBAT -PAVN**

<u>DIA STUDY</u>	<u>MACV</u>	<u>MACV</u>	<u>REASON FOR DIFFERENCE</u>
CLASS I	3	2	PAVN/VC PLANNING FIGURE IS 2 lbs PER MAN.
CLASS II & IV	3	3	
CLASS III	1.7	0	CLASS III IS COMPUTED IN LOC CAPACITY.
CLASS V	<u>5.5</u>	<u>32</u>	MACV EXPERIENCE FACTOR AND REDUCED LEVEL OF LIGHT COMBAT. 1/5 OF THE FORCES IN CONTACT EVERY SEVENTH DAY USING 1/3 OF THEIR BASIC LOAD
	<u>13.2 lbs</u>	<u>8.2 lbs</u>	

**POUNDS PER MAN PER DAY REQUIRED - VIET CONG**

**ALL CLASSES OF SUPPLY** 3.6 lbs 3.6 lbs

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## BNS SUPPORTABLE BY LOC CAPACITY

	<u>TOTAL LOC CAPACITY</u>	<u>TONS / DAY</u>
1.		234
2.	PRESENT FORCE REQUIREMENT	83.42
A.	27 PAVN BNS AT 1.86 TONS (1 BN = 600 MEN AT 6.2 lbs / DAY = 1.86 TONS)	50.22
B.	83 VC BNS AT .4 TON (1 BN = 500 MEN AT 1.6 LBS = .4 TON)	$\frac{33.20}{83.42}$
3.	EXCESS TONNAGE AVAILABLE	150.58
4.	150 ÷ 1.86 (TONS TO SUPPORT ONE PAVN BN) = 80 BNS	
5.	PRESENT STRENGTH EXCESS SUPPORTABLE TOTAL BNS SUPPORTABLE	$\frac{110 \text{ BNS}}{\frac{80 \text{ BNS}}{190 \text{ BNS}}}$

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